A variety of distributed protocols require pairs of neighbouring nodes of a network to repeatedly interact in pairwise exchanges of messages of mutual interest. Well known examples include file-sharing systems [4] and gossip dissemination protocols [18, 17] , among many other examples. These protocols can operate in very diverse settings such as wireless ad-hoc or peer-to-peer overlay networks. These settings pose three main challenges. First, networks are inherently dynamic, whether due to uncontrolled mobility or maintenance of the overlay. Second, since communication may be costly, nodes may act rationally by not sending messages, while still receiving messages from their neighbours. Third, nodes may have incomplete information about the network topology. In this work, we aim at gaining theoretical insight into how to persuade agents to exchange messages in dynamic networks.
INTRODUCTION
A variety of protocols require pairs of neighbouring nodes of a network to repeatedly interact in pairwise exchanges of messages that are of mutual interest to both parties. Well known examples include file-sharing systems [4] and gossip dissemination protocols [18, 17, 9] . These protocols can operate in very diverse settings such as wireless ad-hoc or peerto-peer overlay networks. These settings pose three main challenges. First, networks are inherently dynamic, whether due to uncontrolled mobility or maintenance of the overlay. Second, since communication may be costly, nodes may act rationally by not sending messages, while still receiving messages from their neighbours. Third, nodes may have incomplete information about the network topology. In this work, we aim at gaining theoretical insight into how to persuade agents to exchange messages in dynamic networks.
A growing body of literature has taken a game theoretical approach [22] to address rational behaviour in a variety of distributed problems in static networks (e.g., [10, 1, 2, 3, 26] ). Nodes are viewed as being under the control of rational agents 1 that seek to maximize individual utilities. In these lines, we use Game Theory to address the problem of rational behaviour in pairwise exchanges of messages over links of a dynamic network. We consider that agents obtain a benefit of receiving messages from their neighbours, and incur costs for sending and receiving messages. We are interested in protocols that satisfy two properties: (1) agents exchange messages in every pairwise interaction with neighbours, in order to provide some useful service such as file-sharing and (2) the protocols are equilibria according to some solution concept (e.g., Nash equilibrium), so that no agent gains (increases its utility) by deviating from the protocol. Protocols that satisfy these properties are said to enforce accountability in pairwise exchanges.
Folk Theorems. Results known as Folk Theorems have shown that it is possible to enforce accountability by holding agents accountable for deviations with punishments that decrease their utility [19] , provided that (1) agents want to participate in exchanges, i.e., the benefits of receiving messages outweigh the communication costs, (2) agents perceive interactions to occur infinitely often, which is possible if the end-horizon of interactions is unknown [22] , and (3) a monitoring infrastructure provides agents with sufficient information regarding the past behaviour of other agents, so that any deviation from the protocol may be promptly detected and punished. In a distributed system, agents may only learn about past behaviour of other agents in messages received from their neighbours. Therefore, a monitoring infrastructure is constrained by the network. Unfortunately, most proofs of Folk Theorems assume an exogenous monitoring infrastructure, ignoring the constraints imposed by dynamic networks. Some proofs of Folk Theorems take into account network constraints [6, 24] , but they assume that networks are static or that agents know a probability distribution over topologies at each point in time. Such knowledge may not be readily available to agents in our setting. As we shall see, this poses multiple challenges not addressed by existing proofs of Folk Theorems.
Contributions. We bridge the gap between existing proofs of Folk Theorems and the goal of enforcing accountability in dynamic networks. We make three contributions: (1) we provide a new game theoretical model of repeated interactions in dynamic networks, where agents have incomplete information of the topology, (2) we define a new solution concept for this model, and (3) we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for enforcing accountability in the aforementioned model.
Game Theoretical Model. We consider that an adversary selects the network topologies [15] . We focus on networks that are not under the control of the agents, exemplified by wireless ad-hoc networks and overlays such as [18, 17] . To capture such exogenous restrictions on the network, we assume that the adversary is oblivious to the messages sent by agents, selecting the topologies for all times prior to the beginning of the exchanges. At each point in time, agents learn partial information about the current topology, including the identities of their current neighbours. They also possess information about the subset G * of dynamic networks that the adversary may generate. In practice, the set G * represents basic information known by agents regarding the network structure. For instance, in an overlay network designed to disseminate data in a reliable fashion, agents expect the adversary to only generate connected networks (hence, G * only contains connected networks), whereas in a more dynamic setting such as a wireless ad-hoc network, G * may contain a wider variety of non-connected networks.
Solution Concept. We define a solution concept for our model, named G * -Oblivious Adversary Perfect Equilibrium (G * -OAPE). To understand its definition, it is useful to recall the notion of Nash equilibrium, which states that a protocol is an equilibrium if it is a best response, i.e., no agent can gain by deviating given that other agents also do not deviate. This definition does not suit our purposes for two reasons. First, it does not consider deviations off the equilibrium path, i.e., deviations that occur after histories of messages where some agents have deviated [22] . Thus, a Nash equilibrium may rely on empty threats of punishments such as punishments that also cause some utility loss to the punishers. Second, agents must know the probability distribution of the adversary generating each topology. The first issue is addressed in the literature by the notion of sequential equilibrium (SE) [14] , which requires protocols to be best responses after every history of messages. To address the second issue, the notion of G * -OAPE refines SE by requiring protocols to be best responses after every history, for any fixed network in G * generated by the adversary. In other words, we require that agents cannot gain from deviating given that the adversary may generate any network in G * , even if the agents know the network generated by the adversary.
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions. The main goal of the paper is to determine the degree of dynamism that we can tolerate in order to enforce accountability in pairwise exchanges, i.e., we aim to determine necessary and sufficient restrictions on G * for G * -OAPE protocols that enforce accountability to exist. Our results show that the ability to enforce accountability depends not only on G * but also on the structure and utility of pairwise exchanges.
We determined the weakest set of restrictions on G * for which we can enforce accountability. Our first result shows that G * must satisfy a property named timely punishments. Intuitively, this property states that for ever pairwise exchange between agents i and j, agent j must always be able to communicate a deviation of i to some third agent that later interacts with i, and thus is able to punish i for that deviation. This restriction is not met by some networks such as file-sharing overlays (e.g., Bittorrent [4] ), where users with similar interests interact frequently with each other but only rarely with users with different interests. Our next result provides a G * -OAPE protocol that enforces accountability, assuming that G * is restricted by timely punishments and that exchanges are valuable, that is, agents have a high benefit/cost ratio of receiving/ sending messages and neglect download costs. Such type of exchanges occurs, for instance, when agents share small but highly valuable secrets such as private keys [18, 17] .
In many cases, the assumption that pairwise exchanges are valuable is too restrictive. For instance, in file-sharing, we may expect agents to be interested in exchanging large files, but the cost of uploading such files is certainly nonnegligible, and the benefit-to-cost ratio of receiving/ sending files may be small. It is therefore of practical interest to understand whether we can enforce accountability in more general settings. Our final two results identify a necessary and a sufficient condition to achieve this goal. Namely, we show that G * must satisfy, in addition to timely punishments, a property that we call eventual distinguishability. Roughly speaking, this property states that whenever two (or more) agents may punish i from defecting in the past (towards some other agent j), they have the information necessary to coordinate their actions, so that the total number of additional punishments for a single deviation of i is never too large. Whether G * satisfies eventual distinguishability depends both on the properties of graphs in G * and on the information available to agents about the topology. Following previous work in dynamic networks [15] , we consider a class of connected networks where agents have knowledge of the degree of their neighbours, which are formed by overlay networks such as [18, 17, 9] . We show that if networks in G * are contained in this class of connected networks, then there is a protocol that enforces accountability in general pairwise exchanges. Summary of Results. Our results are summarized in Fig. 1 . We show that, in general, timely punishments (grey area) and eventual distinguishability (dotted area) are necessary conditions for enforcing accountability, whereas connectivity is a sufficient condition (protocol P 1). In valuable pairwise exchanges, timely punishments are necessary and sufficient for enforcing accountability (protocol P 2).
Related work. Existing works have used Game Theory to analyse interactions in file sharing [12, 21, 16] and gossip dissemination [18, 17] . Unlike these works, we do not limit our analysis to one-shot pairwise interactions. Our proposed model and results are more related to work in models of dynamic games and network formation games. In the former, the structure of the game being repeated varies in each repetition according to a known probability distribution [19, 6, 7] . This captures repetitions of the same game where only the network topology varies. In the latter, the network is the outcome of the actions of rational agents [5, 20] . To the best of our knowledge, none of these models captures network variations as being caused by an adversary oblivious to the actions of agents, and they do not model incomplete information of the network topology. Hence, they are not appropriate for modelling unpredictable changes in the network such as physical topology changes. More importantly, they do not address the challenges of devising distributed monitoring mechanisms. Work in reputation systems such as [13, 8] have proposed and analysed distributed systems that perform monitoring. These works are not comparable to ours because they do not prove Folk Theorems.
MODEL
We consider a synchronous message passing system with reliable communication in a dynamic network. The system entities are the rational agents, which send messages over links of the network, and an oblivious adversary, which selects the dynamic network at the beginning. Specifically, time is divided into rounds. Prior to the execution of the protocol, the adversary selects an evolving graph G that specifies the communication graph G m of each round m. Let G be the set of all evolving graphs, and let N = {1 . . . n} be the set of agents, where n is the number of agents. As in [1, 2] , we assume that edges are private: agent i can send a message to j at round m only if j is a neighbour of i in G m , and if i sends that message, then exactly j receives it; if i has multiple neighbours, then i can discriminate neighbours by sending different messages to each. We also assume for simplicity that graphs are undirected. Finally, we assume that each agent knows n and the identities of its neighbours in each round m, prior to sending messages in m.
Pairwise Exchanges
We consider an infinitely repeated game of pairwise exchanges of messages between neighbouring agents. Given G ∈ G, at each round m, every two neighbouring agents i and j have values of interest to each other. The goal is to persuade i and j to share these values plus some additional information required to monitor other agents.
Actions and histories. Agents i and j may exchange messages in one or more communication steps. For simplicity, we abstract communication by considering a finite set of individual actions, which capture most exchanges of interest, namely (1) defection, where i omits messages (and thus passively punishes j), (2) cooperation, where i sends its value plus monitoring information to j, and (3) active punishment, where i sends messages while causing a utility loss to j (for instance, if i sends garbage instead of the value [18] ). Our results can easily be generalized to arbitrary (finite) sets of individual actions. In some of our results, we also consider that a punishment can be proportional to some constant c, i.e., can cause a utility loss proportional to c; we also consider a fourth action of punishment avoidance, where i avoids the cost of a punishment but does not receive the value from j. Both punishment avoidance and proportional punishments are possible actions when multiple communication steps occur between agents; later, we discuss possible implementations.
At every round m, i and j simultaneously follow an individual action, and are only informed of each other's individual actions at the end of the round. A round-m action ai of i specifies the individual actions of i towards every neighbour. A round-m action profile a specifies the round-m actions followed by all agents. When the adversary generates an evolving graph G ∈ G, repeated pairwise exchanges are characterized by a set H(G) of histories. A round-m history h ∈ H(G) is a pair (( a m ) m <m , G) representing the sequence of action profiles a m followed in rounds m < m and the evolving graph G selected by the adversary. In other words, h represents global information available immediately before agents follow round-m actions. A run r is a function mapping each round m to a round-m history r(m) 2 .
Information and Strategies. Information available to agents can be divided into knowledge about the game structure and private observations.
Regarding the former, we assume that the main information about the game structure is common knowledge 3 . In Theorem 1 we show that some minimal restrictions on the evolving graphs generated by the adversary are required to enforce accountability in dynamic networks. Therefore, the adversary must be constrained to generate only a subset G * ⊆ G. We also assume that G * is common knowledge. Note that our model is general, and we may consider G * = G (although, as we show, in this case, it is not possible to persuade agents to exchange messages).
Regarding private observations, given G ∈ G and round m, every agent i acquires some information about G m prior to sending messages in m, which includes the identity of the round-m neighbours of i. We represent this information as a set G m i of graphs, such that G m ∈ G m i and, in every graph G in G m i agent i obtains the same information aboutḠ m and G m . For instance, if agents only know the identity of their neighbours, then G m i is the set of graphs where i has the same set of neighbours as in G m .
Given a round-m history h, there is a private history hi of observations made by i up to the beginning of round m, which include the sets G m i for every round m ≤ m, the actions of i in every round m < m, and the individual actions followed by neighbours of i towards i in every round m < m. We can associate to each private history hi a round-m information set Ii containing the histories that provide the same information as in hi. Given G ∈ G, we denote by Ii(G) the set of information sets of i compatible with G. We make the standard assumption that agents have perfect recall, that is, agents recall all their observations made in the past.
A strategy σi of agent i corresponds to a distributed protocol. Specifically, for each G ∈ G and information set Ii ∈ Ii(G), σi(· | Ii) is a probability distribution over roundm actions available to i. We use the designation protocol for strategy profiles σ, which specify the strategies followed by every agent.
Utility. When agents follow an action profile a, agent i obtains a utility ui( a). This is the sum of the utilities obtained in interactions with each neighbour j given as the difference between the benefits of receiving a value from j and the costs of punishments and communication. Specifically, whenever j follows a cooperation or punishment action and i does not avoid a punishment, i obtains a benefit β of receiving j's value. Regarding communication costs, i incurs a normalized cost 1 of sending messages in cooperation and punishment actions, incurs no cost by defecting and avoiding punishments, and incurs the cost α of receiving messages from j. Finally, a punishment of j proportional to c causes a utility loss of cπ to i, where π is the unitary cost per punishment.
We now define the (total) expected utility ui( σ | G, Ii) of i when agents follow a given protocol σ, conditional on some G ∈ G * and on a round-m information set Ii. Given a round-m history h ∈ Ii, σ defines a probability distribution over runs compatible with G and h. Therefore, we can compute the expected utility of i in every future round m ≥ m conditional on G and h as the expected value of ui( a), where the expectation is taken relative to the probability defined by σ of agents following action profile a in round m . With this in mind, ui( σ | G, Ii) is the expected value of ui( a) for every future round m ≥ m, as computed in round m. Formally, we need to take into account both (1) the probability of each h ∈ Ii being realized and (2) the effect of time on the value of future utilities. Regarding (1), we consider a belief system µ, specifying the probability µ(h | G, Ii) that h is realized. Regarding (2), we follow the standard approach [19] of assuming that the value of future utilities decays over time with a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), so the expected utility in round m discounted to round m is δ m −m ui( a). Let ui( σ | G, h) be the sum of the expected value of ui( a) for every future round m ≥ m, discounted to m by δ, conditional on G and h; then, ui( σ | G, Ii) is the expected value of ui( σ | G, h), where the expectation is taken relative to µ(h | G, Ii).
Enforcing Accountability
We say that a protocol σ enforces accountability iff (1) in σ, agents always cooperate by exchanging their values, until some agent deviates, and (2) σ is an equilibrium, so that no agent gains by deviating. Regarding (2), we need to define a solution concept, specifying exact conditions under which σ is an equilibrium.
Solution Concept. We define a new solution concept for our model, which is a refinement of sequential equilibrium (SE) [14] . In its original definition, a protocol σ * is said to be a SE if there is a belief system µ * consistent with σ * (see below) such that for every agent i and information set Ii, i cannot gain by deviating from σ * conditioning on Ii. We refine this definition by also conditioning on every evolving graph G ∈ G * that may be selected by the adversary. Given this refinement, if σ * is an equilibrium under our solution concept, then no agent i gains by deviating from σ * i given that other agents do not deviate, even if i knows what is the evolving graph generated by the adversary. In particular, agent i does not gain from not punishing other agents or not forwarding monitoring information that may trigger additional punishments.
Formally, we say that σ * is a G * -Oblivious Adversary Perfect Equilibrium (G * -OAPE) iff there is a belief system µ * consistent with σ * and G * such that, for every G ∈ G * , agent i, strategy σi, and information set Ii ∈ Ii(G), ui( σ * | G, Ii) ≥ ui((σi, σ * −i ) | G, Ii), where the expectation is taken relative to µ * , and (σi, σ * −i ) is the protocol where only i deviates from σ * i by following σi. The definition of belief system consistent with σ * and G * is very technical, and we leave it to the full paper [23] . Intuitively, given G, if Ii is consistent with agents following σ * (i.e., agents could have taken the actions observed in Ii if they were following σ * and the evolving graph being G), then i believes that agents followed σ * , otherwise, i believes that they followed some alternative protocol.
KEY CONCEPTS
In the proofs of our results, we identify multiple key concepts related to the properties of the protocols and evolving graphs. We summarize them here for future reference.
Safe-bounded protocols. It turns out that it is relevant to our results to distinguish between safe and non-safe protocols, and between bounded and non-bounded protocols. Regarding the former, a protocol σ is safe if in every interaction agents either cooperate or punish each other, thus never omitting messages. Otherwise, σ is non-safe. In the full paper, we show that in general non-safe protocols are not G * -OAPE. Intuitively, when an agent i defects another as a punishment for a past deviation, that defection can be interpreted as a profitable deviation, i.e., a deviation where i avoids the cost of forwarding data. As a result, further punishments are triggered to punish i, and i gains from not carrying the punishment. This precludes the protocol from being an equilibrium. For this reason, part of our results focus on incentives that use only active punishments, which cannot be mistaken for profitable deviations. Regarding the latter, a protocol σ is bounded if the duration of punishments is bounded. Specifically, every protocol can be represented as a state machine [22] ; in a bounded protocol, (1) the number of states is finite, (2) some of those states are cooperation states where all agents cooperate, and (3) starting from an arbitrary state, the time of convergence to a cooperation state is bounded. Bounded protocols are simpler to analyse and more useful in practice, since they ensure that memory is bounded, which is an important requirement in dynamic networks. For these reasons, we also restrict part of the analysis to bounded protocols. The full paper also generalizes our results for non-bounded protocols.
Punishment Opportunities. Roughly speaking, a punishment opportunity (PO) for an interaction of agent i with j is a later interaction between an agent l and i where l may have been informed of a deviation of i towards j and thus has the opportunity to punish i. This requires the existence of a temporal path (a sequence of causally influenced interactions) from j to l in the evolving graph such that i cannot interfere with information forwarded from j to l. Formally, given G ∈ G * and agent i, a round-m i-edge is a pair (j, m) where (i, j) is an edge in G m . We say that j causally influences l in G between m and m [15] , denoted (j, m) ; G (l, m ), if m < m and either j = l or there is a j-edge (o, m ) in G such that (o, m ) ; G (l, m ). We say that j causally influences l in G without interference from i between rounds m and m , denoted as (j, m) ; G i (l, m ), if the above holds for o = i. A PO of i for (j, m) in G is an i-edge (l, m ) such that (j, m) ; G i (l, m ). Evasive strategies. Given a protocol σ * , an evasive strategy σ i for agent i is a strategy where i first deviates from σ * i by defecting some neighbours, and then hides this deviation from as many agents as possible, for as long as possible. In particular, i may defect a neighbour j and then behave as if nothing happened, so that the probability of neighbours of i not causally influenced by j observing each information set is the same, whether i follows σ * i or σ i . Therefore, those agents cannot punish i for the defection.
Indistinguishable Evolving Graphs. We say that an evolving graph G is indistinguishable from G to agent i at round m if i acquires the same information about G and G , regardless of the protocol followed by agents. Formally, given G ∈ G * and round m ≥ m, let G m j (G) be the set of round-m graphs that provide the same the information to j about the round-m topology as G m , and let C m i (G) be the set of agents j such that (j, m ) ;
WEAKEST ADVERSARY
We identify a necessary restriction on G for enforcing accountability, and provide a protocol that enforces accountability assuming only this restriction and that pairwise exchanges are valuable.
Need for Timely Punishments
The weakest restriction on G * is called timely punish-ments. In a nutshel, this property states that there is some known horizon ρ such that, if i defects some neighbour j at round m, then i may be punished before round m + ρ.
More precisely, for some bound ρ > 0, and for every G ∈ G * , agent i, and i-edge (j, m), there must be a PO (l, m ) of i in G for (j, m) such that m < m + ρ. The need for this restriction is fairly intuitive. If the adversary is not restricted by timely punishments, then there is G ∈ G * and an agent i such that either (1) for some i-edge (j, m), there is no PO of i in G for that i-edge, or (2) there is no limit on the time it takes between an interaction of i and a corresponding PO. In case (1), i can follow an evasive strategy to ensure that no agent capable of punishing i learns about the defection, thus never being punished. In case (2), i can delay a punishment for an arbitrarily long time; the problem here is the discount factor δ: for an arbitrarily large constant d, there is an interaction of i such that, if i defects the neighbour and later follows an evasive strategy, then i is only punished after d rounds, and the utility loss of this punishment is discounted by δ d ; for a sufficiently large d, the immediate gain of defecting outweighs the loss. Unfortunately, some real networks do not always admit timely punishments. For instance, in a file sharing application, agents with similar interest may exchange files frequently, but occasionally they may interact with agents with different interests. If agents i and j have different interests and i happens to interact with j, then j may never be able to report a defection of i to agents with interests similar to i, which may be the only PO of i.
Theorem 1 shows that timely punishments are necessary to enforce accountability. Theorem 1. If the adversary is not restricted by timely punishments, then there is no protocol that enforces accountability.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that σ * enforces accountability. Suppose also that the adversary is not restricted by timely punishments. For every ρ > 0, we can fix G ∈ G * , agent i, and i-edge (j, m) such that, for every PO (l, m ) of i for (j, m) in G, we have m − m ≥ ρ. This implies that, for every round m ≥ m with m < m + ρ, and every i-edge (l, m ) with l = j, (j, m) ; G (l, m ) is false, since the existence of a PO (l, m ) of i for (j, m) in G with m < m + ρ is equivalent to the existence of one such (l, m ) with (j, m) ; G (l, m ). Let ρ be such that yδ ρ /(1 − δ) < 1, where y is the (bounded) maximum difference between utilities of a single interaction. Since σ * i enforces accountability, i is expected to cooperate at every round-m information set Ii ∈ Ii(G) consistent with σ * and G. Here, i may follow an evasive strategy σ i relative to σ * , G, and (j, m) (see the full paper for details). Let σ = (σ i , σ * −i ). By the properties of evasive strategies, for every round m < m + ρ with m ≥ m, the round-m neighbours of i observe each round-m + 1 information set with the same probability, whether i follows σ i or σ * i . Since these information sets specify the individual actions followed by and taken towards i, the expected utility of i in round m is the same, whether agents follow σ or σ * , except i avoids at least the cost 1 of defecting j in round m. Moreover, the maximum utility difference in every round m ≥ m + ρ is yn. Therefore, we have
This contradicts the assumption that σ * enforces account-ability, concluding the proof.
Although the proof of this theorem is relatively straightforward, it is central for the remainder of the paper, as this result constrains the possible solutions that enforce accountability in dynamic networks.
A G * -OAPE for Valuable Pairwise Exchanges with Timely Punishments
We now describe a protocol σ val that enforces accountability in a setting of valuable pairwise exchanges (defined below), assuming an adversary restricted by timely punishments. In valuable pairwise exchanges, we assume that agents can perform proportional punishments and punishment avoidance actions. This implies that agents can punish each other with a cost proportional to π, and they can avoid such punishments at the expense of not receiving the value from their neighbours. We also assume that the benefit-tocost ratio of receiving/ sending a value is high. Specifically, we assume that β > 1 + α + ρπ and π > n, where ρ is the constant in the definition of timely punishments. At the end of this section, we discuss exchanges that can be modelled in this way, assuming that agents exchange multiple messages per round and neglect download costs (α = 0).
We now describe σ val . In every round, agents exchange values and monitoring information that includes accusations revealing defections. These accusations are disseminated across the network, and used by agents to adjust the cost of a punishment applied to neighbours. More precisely, let ρ be as in the definition of timely punishments. At the beginning of round m, agent i keeps for every agent l and round m ∈ {m − ρ . . . m − 1} a report indicating whether l defected some neighbour in round m . We call a report indicating a defection an accusation. In a round-m action, agents i and j exchange their reports and values, and apply punishments proportional to the number of accusations against each other. At the end of round m, i updates its reports relative to every l = j and m < m if j does not defect i, otherwise i emits an accusation against j for round m.
In the full paper, we prove Theorem 2, which shows that σ val enforces accountability in valuable pairwise exchanges, under two minimal assumptions: (1) the adversary is restricted by timely punishments, which as we have seen is strictly necessary, and (2) agents are sufficiently patient, i.e., the factor δ is sufficiently close to 1, which is a standard assumption in proofs of Folk Theorems, and is necessary for future losses of punishments to always outweigh the gains of deviating in the present (recall that future losses are discounted to the present by δ). The proof shows that a defection of i is always matched by a punishment that occurs after at most ρ rounds. i gains at most n by defecting neighbours in a round, while losing at least δ ρ π. Given that β > 1 + α + ρπ and π > n, if δ is sufficiently close to 1, then the loss outweighs the gain. Moreover, if i avoids the cost of a punishment and of sending and receiving messages (at most 1 + α + ρπ), i does not receive the value, thus losing β. Since i can never influence the reports relative to itself, i never gains by deviating.
Theorem 2. If the adversary is restricted by timely punishments and agents are sufficiently patient, then σ val enforces accountability in valuable pairwise exchanges.
Examples of Valuable Pairwise Exchanges
We now provide examples of interactions that meet the restrictions of valuable pairwise exchanges. First, we consider an interaction without cryptography. Then, we show how cryptography can decrease the number of restrictions on the utility.
Without cryptography.
Consider that every neighbouring agents i and j can exchange messages in three phases per round and neglect download costs, which may be the case if bandwidth is asymmetric. In phase 1, i sends reports indicating the number cj of accusations against j, and similarly j sends the number ci of accusations against i. In phase 2, i and j send ci and cj penance messages that cost π each, respectively. In phase 3, they exchange their values only if both agents have sent all required information in previous phases. In this setting, agents can adjust the size of penances such that π > n. Suppose that the communication costs are normalized such that the total cost of sending phase 1, 2, and 3 messages is 1.
If i sends all requested information in the first two phases, i does not avoid the punishment of sending the ci penance messages, while avoiding at most the cost 1 of defecting j by not sending the value in phase 3. As shown by the proof of Theorem 2, i does not gain from defecting. i can avoid the punishment by not sending the requested messages in the first two phases, but in this case i does not receive the value from j in phase 3, also not gaining from this deviation.
With cryptography.
The previous interactions require knowledge of β in order to appropriately define the size of a penance message, and require β = Ω(nρ), making it restrictive in practice if n is large. We can mitigate these problems using the technique of delaying gratification from [18] . Instead of exchanging values in phase 3 of round r, neighbours i and j exchange the values ciphered with private keys in phase 1 along with monitoring information. In phase 2, they still send the penances and in phase 3 they exchange the keys. As before, if messages are omitted in phase 1 or 2, then the agents send no further messages. Let α κ be the cost of sending the key. This mechanism only requires π > α k and β > 1 + nρπ. Thus, it suffices that β > 1 + , where = nρα κ . If α κ 1, then 1 + is close to the optimal restriction of β > 1. It is also possible to adjust π without knowing β: we can define the size of a penance to be larger than that of a key, but smaller than the value. The arguments that show that this mechanism is a G * -OAPE are the same as in the proof of Theorem 2.
GENERAL PAIRWISE EXCHANGES
We now address the problem of enforcing accountability without making the assumption that pairwise exchanges are valuable. We consider the least restrictive assumptions about utility and individual actions available to agents. Namely, we consider the smallest benefit-to-cost ratio of receiving/ sending values. We still need the benefit β to be larger than the total costs 1 + α of sending and receiving messages, or else agents would not have incentives to engage in exchanges. Second, we do not assume that agents neglect download costs (α ≥ 0), nor that they communicate in multiple steps. Therefore, proportional punishments and punishment avoidance are not available actions. We still assume that agents can defect, cooperate, or (actively) punish other agents. Since there is a trivial one-shot implementation of active punishments, where an agent sends garbage of the size of the value instead of the value, we consider that a punishment causes a utility loss of π ≥ β to the punished agent, whereas the punisher agent incurs a cost of 1.
With this in mind, we say that a protocol enforces accountability in general pairwise exchanges if it is an equilibrium for all utilities such that β > 1 + α, and only has agents following the three aforementioned actions. We show in the full paper that non-safe protocols cannot in general enforce accountability. In this section, we identify a necessary and a sufficient condition for enforcing accountability with safe-bounded protocols in general pairwise exchanges. The results are generalized for non-bounded protocols in the full paper.
Need for Eventual Distinguishability
We identify a necessary restriction on G * to enforce accountability with safe-bounded protocols in general pairwise exchanges, called eventual distinguishability. Due to lack of space, we only provide an informal definition of this condition and an intuition for its necessity, deferring the formal definition, proof, and generalization for non-bounded protocols to the full paper.
Intuitively, for every interaction between an agent i and a neighbour j, if i defects j, then i must be punished by at least one agent in a future interaction, or else i gains by defecting. In this section, we show that there is a problem if i is punished by two or more agents for every defection. Namely, if i repeatedly defects neighbours and is punished by two or more agents for each of those defections, then the number of future punishments that i expects to receive in the future grows without bound as i keeps defecting neighbours. Consequently, the protocol cannot be bounded, since there is no bound on the time it takes for punishments to end after i stops deviating. The condition of eventual distinguishability establishes restrictions on G * that allow us to devise G * -OAPE protocols where an agent is punished only once for each defection.
More precisely, we say that the adversary is restricted by eventual distinguishability if for every evolving graph G in G * and agent i, eventually i stops having interactions in G where i defects some neighbour j, and then expects to be punished by two or more agents for that defection, because each of those agents cannot distinguish between two evolving graphs where it should and should not punish i. Specifically, the formal definition of eventual distinguishability has two parts: (1) a definition of indistinguishable rounds, in which a defection of some agent is matched by more than one future punishment, and (2) the requirement that indistinguishable rounds must eventually stop occurring. Fig. 2 depicts an example of an indistinguishable round. There are three agents numbered 1 to 3. The adversary may generate three alternative evolving graphs G 1 , G 2 , and G 3 . In round 1, agent 1 interacts with agent 2. In round 2, agent 2 interacts with agents 3. In round 3, the interactions depend on the evolving graph: (G 1 ) i interacts only with 2, (G 2 ) i interacts only with 3, and (G 3 ) i interacts with both 2 and 3. If the protocol is safe and enforces accountability in general pairwise exchanges, then 1 must send a message to 2 in round 1. If 1 defects 2, then 1 must be punished at least once. This is because, by defecting, 1 avoids the cost 1 of sending a message, so this gain must be matched by a future loss of at least π > 1. Suppose that round 3 is the only opportunity to punish i for defecting 2 in round 1, in time. Then, agent 1 must be punished by agent 2 in G 1 and by agent 3 in G 2 , respectively. In the latter case, since agent 3 does not directly observe the defection of 1, agent 2 must tell agent 3 in round 2 about the defection of agent 1 when the evolving graph is G 2 . Since agent 2 cannot distinguish G 2 from G 3 at round 2, it must also tell agent 3 about the defection of 1 in G 3 . If the only information about the topology is the identity of the neighbours, then neither agent 2 nor agent 3 can distinguish G 1 from G 3 nor G 2 from G 3 , respectively. This means that in G 3 both agents 2 and 3 must punish 1 for defecting 2 in round 1. Therefore, after round 1, agent 1 expects to be punished by two neighbours, even though 1 only defects one neighbour.
The above example shows that there is a round-2 information set I1 ∈ I1(G 3 ) such that, according to the information in I1 available to 1, the expected number of punishments of 1 conditional on G 3 and I1 is 2. If this type of interactions keeps occurring in G 3 , then, for an arbitrarily large number c, there is an information set I1 ∈ I1(G 3 ) such that, basing on the information in I1, agent 1 expects to be punished by at least c neighbours after I1. The fact that only agent 1 deviates plays a key role here: by the definition of equilibrium, we only need to ensure that 1 never gains by defecting a neighbour at round 1 provided that other agents do not deviate afterwards. If multiple agents deviate after round 1 (e.g., agent 2 defects 3 in round 2), then 1's defection in round 1 can be forgiven, since such behaviour is unexpected at the time 1 decides to defect 2 in round 1.
The assumption that protocols are safe is also crucial, since non-safe protocols are not susceptible to the aforementioned problem. Unfortunately, as we show in the full paper, we cannot in general devise a non-safe protocol that enforces accountability.
In the full paper, we prove Theorem 3. The proof shows that, if the adversary is not restricted by eventual distinguishability, then, for some agent i and evolving graph G in G * , if i always defects all neighbours in G, then, in an indistinguishable round, the expected number of future punishments after the defections is strictly larger than before, whereas in all remaining rounds the expected number of punishments never decreases. This is sufficient to show that the expected number of punishments is unbounded, and hence that no safe protocol that enforces accountability in general pairwise exchanges can be bounded.
Theorem 3. If the adversary is not restricted by eventual distinguishability, then there is no safe-bounded protocol that enforces accountability in general pairwise exchanges.
A G * -OAPE for General Pairwise Exchanges with Connectivity
We now describe a restriction of connectivity on G * that ensures that the adversary is restricted by eventual distinguishability. We also show that under this restriction there is a safe-bounded protocol that enforces accountability in general pairwise exchanges. To understand the restriction, it is useful to first recall the scenario of Figure 2 . In this scenario, the problem arises because neither agent 2 can distinguish G 1 from G 3 at round 3 nor agent 3 can distinguish G 2 from G 3 at round 3, and thus they cannot coordinate their actions to punish 1 only once. This problem can be avoided if agents can learn the degree of their neighbours prior to deciding whether to punish them. However, the knowledge of the degree is not sufficient to satisfy eventual distinguishability, since for instance we may have a scenario similar to the one depicted in Figure 2 , except agents 2 and 3 do not punish 1 in the same round. This can be avoided if it is always the case that agents 2 and 3 always punish 1 in the same round. The problem also does not arise if, for instance, agent 2 is the first to punish 1 and then warns agent 3 of this fact before 3 interacts with 1.
More generally, it suffices that, for every G ∈ G * , agent i, and round m, there is an horizon ρ such that the round-m neighbours of i causally influence every round-m + ρ neighbour of i between m and m + ρ without interference from i. This condition is exactly met with ρ = n when G * is restricted by a condition similar to 1-connectivity from [15] : we say that the adversary is restricted by connectivity iff agents know the degree of their neighbours and, for every G ∈ G * , agent i, and round m, the graph obtained from G m by removing the edges to i is connected. This condition is also met by overlays for gossip dissemination such as [18, 17, 9] .
We now define a safe-bounded protocol σ gen that enforces accountability in general pairwise exchanges, assuming that the adversary is restricted by connectivity. Fix G ∈ G * and let deg m i denote the degree of i in G m . At every round m, neighbouring agents always exchange monitoring information, and they follow punishment individual actions with a probability proportional to past deviations. Monitoring information includes reports and numbers of pending punishments. Specifically, for each round m < m and pair of agents (j, l), a report relative to m and (j, l) specifies whether j interacted with l in round m , and whether l defected j. For each c ∈ {1 . . . n} and agent j, agents keep the number of pending punishments to be applied to j in periodic rounds (c + kn) k≥0 . Before interacting with j in round m, i determines whether j should be punished. For this, i updates the number x of pending punishments for the period that includes m. If m ≤ n, then x = 0. Otherwise, let x be the previous number of pending punishments resulting from an identical update prior to round m − n. Given the round-m − n reports, i determines deg m−n j . Then, i sets x to max(0, x − deg m−n j ), and adds deg m−n j iff j defected some neighbour in m − n. i punishes j with probability min(1, x/deg m j ). (This is where the knowledge of degree comes into play.) After the interaction, i emits a report indicating that the interaction occurred in round m and signalling whether j defected i. i also updates its monitoring information basing on the information sent by its neighbours. for all neighbour j do 7:
pr ← min(1, AP m j /deg m j )
8:
With probability pr, cooperate Punishment
9:
Otherwise, punish Cooperation 10: End 11: After round m 12:
for all neighbour j do
13:
if j defects i in m then
14:
RP m ij ← Bad 15: 
29: End
For each report relative to round m < m not older than m − n + 1 and pair (k, l), if i does not have a report relative to m and (k, l) and receives a new report from j = l, then i stores this report. In addition, for each period c not including m, i updates the number of pending punishments relative to every l = i and c to the maximum between its value and the value sent by every neighbour j = l, capping it to lie in {0 . . . n − 1}.
We present in Alg. 1 the pseudo-code for the strategy σ gen i of agent i. We use two variables: AP and RP. For each round m, i keeps a number AP m j of pending punishments to be applied to j in rounds m, m + n, m + 2n, . . ., initially equal to 0 and never larger than n−1. Also, i keeps a report RP m jl ∈ {Good, Bad, ⊥} per pair of nodes (j, l) and round r signalling whether in round m: (i) j did not interact with l (⊥); (ii) l interacted and defected j (Bad); or (iii) l interacted and did not defect j (Good). RP m jl is initialized to ⊥. Notice that these variables can be implemented by a finite state machine: at each round m, agents only need to store and forward information relative to each tuple (i, j, c) for c ∈ {0 . . . n − 1}, corresponding to RP m−c ij , and information relative to each pair (i, c) for c ∈ {0 . . . n − 1}, corresponding to AP m−c i . Therefore, σ gen is a safe-bounded protocol. For the sake of exposition, we opt to not represent the state in this compact form.
This definition has the following properties when agents follow σ gen at every round-m history h: (1) i cannot influence monitoring information that determines punishments applied to i, (2) we match each defection of i in round m to at least one punishment in future rounds, (3) a defection in round m triggers additional punishments to be applied in rounds m+n, m+2n . . ., and (4) the delay of additional punishments is bounded by O(n 2 ). (1) ensures that i does not gain from lying about monitoring information. (2) ensures that, even if i saves the cost 1 of sending messages, i loses at least β > 1. (3) and (4) guarantee that this loss is discounted to the present by a lower bounded factor δ n 2 . This implies that, if agents are sufficiently patient (i.e., δ is sufficiently close to 1), then i prefers not to defect. Therefore, Theorem 4 holds. (See the full paper for a proof.) Theorem 4. If the adversary is restricted by connectivity and agents are sufficiently patient, then σ gen enforces accountability in general pairwise exchanges.
Avoiding Prior Knowledge of Degree
The knowledge of degree can be a restrictive assumption in practice. We now discuss one type of interactions in general pairwise exchanges, where agents only have to know the identity of their neighbours in order for σ gen to be an equilibrium. We only assume that agents engage in multiple message exchanges per interaction. The idea is for neighbouring agents to reveal their degrees before sending the values, and then punish each other proportionally to the degree.
We need at least two communication phases, so that neighbours i and j may first reveal their degree in phase 1, and then exchange values in phase 2 and punish each other accordingly. Unfortunately, two phases is not enough because i may lie about the degree. In particular, in phase 1, i may declare a higher degree than the real one to decrease the probability of being punished by j. We can address this by including in the report information about the declared degrees, and then punish agents that lie about their degrees. This is still not sufficient though, because of the following scenario. Suppose that i only has one neighbour j and only one pending punishment. If i does not lie, then j punishes i with probability 1 due to having a single pending punishment. If i declares a degree of n − 1 instead, then the probability of being punished by j is only 1/(n − 1). This yields an increase in the expected benefits from 0 to β(n − 2)/(n − 1). In addition, suppose that i defects j by omitting messages in phase 2. The expected future loss must be at most β, to avoid the problem identified in the proof of the need for eventual distinguishability. Since we only assume that β > 1 + α, the loss may be lower than the gain.
The problem is that i sends the degree before incurring the cost of sending messages in phase 2. We can avoid this by using the same technique of Section 4.3. We need three communication phases. In phase 1, agents exchange monitoring information and the values ciphered with random private keys. In phase 2, they reveal the degrees. Finally, in phase 3, they decide whether to cooperate by sending the private keys, or to punish by sending arbitrary keys. Let α κ be the cost of sending a key, such that the cost of sending phase 1 and 2 messages plus α κ is 1. Agent i is punished for defecting j in phases 1 or 2 by being punished in a later stage; if i is sufficiently patient, then as in the proof of Theorem 4 i does not gain by deviating in the first two phases. The maximum utility gain obtained by i is when i has only one neighbour j, i lies to j by saying that its degree is n − 1, and then defect j in phase 3. The maximum gain is β(n − 2)/(n − 1) + α κ , whereas the future loss is at least δ n 2 β. If α κ < β/(n − 1), then the gain is less than β, and the future loss outweighs the gain for a δ sufficiently close to 1. Therefore, we have a protocol that enforces accountability.
Complexity
The bit complexity of σ gen is O(n 3 ): each message carries n 3 reports, with one report per pair of agents and round in m − n · · · m − 1, carries n 2 accusations, and carries n 2 numbers of pending punishments. The maximum delay of punishments is O(n 2 ). We can improve the complexity by assuming further restrictions on G * and on the computational ability of agents. Specifically, the factors n 3 and n 2 are a function of (1) the maximum delay n of disseminating information relative to an agent, and (2) the maximum number n of agents relative to which an agent has to forward information. (1) can be improved by considering more restrictive assumptions about G * . As discussed in the definition of adversary restricted by connectivity, we only need that the neighbours of any given agent i in round m can causally influence all the neighbours of i in round m + ρ for some constant ρ. If the evolving graphs satisfy locality properties that ensure that the neighbours of agent i's neighbours are likely to be i's neighbours in the near future, then ρ can be significantly smaller than n. Then, the bit complexity becomes O(ρn 2 ) and the maximum delay of punishments becomes O(ρn). Small-world networks such as social networks, which have a high clustering coefficient, are well known examples that satisfy such locality properties [11, 25] .
Interestingly, locality properties also allow us the improve on (2) . Agents only have to forward information relative to an agent i and round m in the ρ rounds following m. This is necessary to ensure that critical information reaches the agents capable of carrying a punishment. If during every period of ρ rounds each agent were only causally influenced by a limited number c of agents, then agents only needed to forward information relative to c agents, and the bit complexity and delay of punishments would be O(ρc 2 ) and O(ρc), respectively. Unfortunately, such reduction on the amount of information each agent forwards introduces a congestion problem. Specifically, we cannot let agents sending messages of varying size, since that would incentivize them to always forward the minimum required information to save bandwidth. Therefore, they must forward messages of fixed size, which implies that agents may have to discard information if they cannot fit all received information in a single message. This gives the opportunity for an agent i to deliberately generate false reports (or accusations) that flood the network, causing other agents to discard accusations against i. We can address this issue by appending to each report and accusation a signature of the issuer. A report of an interaction between i and j has issuer i, so a valid report of this interaction must contain a signature of i. The same applies to accusations and numbers of pending punishments.
DISCUSSION
Our results provide technical insight on the type of dynamic networks that can support pairwise exchanges in equilibria strategies. The need for timely punishments means that accountability cannot be enforced in some dynamic networks such as certain overlays for file-sharing. If connec-tivity is ensured, accountability may be enforced, even for general exchanges. Although for this scenario we have assumed knowledge of degree prior to interactions, this can be relaxed if agents can exchange multiple messages per round. Finally, if exchanges are valuable, timely punishments are enough to enforce accountability, which opens the door to protocols that enforce accountability in a wide variety of dynamic networks. There are multiple open questions to be addressed in future work. It would be interesting to prove a stronger condition that would close the gap between an adversary restricted by distinguishability and one restricted by connectivity. Another open issue is collusion. We believe that both the necessary and sufficient conditions presented in this paper could be strengthened by generalizing the notion of causal influence without interference from individual agents to the absence of interference from members of a coalition. Given these conditions, the G * -OAPE strategies are resilient to collusion.
